Labour and other Sustainability Considerations in Supply Chains

University of Ottawa · Faculty of Law

Colloquium summary — University of Ottawa, Faculty of Law, 23 October 2026

The colloquium brought together union officials, government negotiators, international civil servants, practitioners and academics from three continents. What follows tracks the programme session by session. Where the discussion allowed it, each session is set out as stocktaking, challenges and solutions. The event was held under Chatham House rules, so nothing here is attributed; quotations are reproduced as spoken and lightly punctuated.

Opening framing. Two sets of remarks set the terms for the day.

The first established the topicality: in the past year every G7 country has advanced regulation on forced labour. Sustainable development sits in the preamble of the WTO Agreement and includes a social dimension, and the instruments states now use to act on it run well beyond trade agreements — import restrictions, due diligence requirements, procurement rules, local content rules and sanctions. The organizing questions were put as: which combination of instruments, for which matters, and how should responsibility for implementing them be shared.

The second was an economist’s account of shifting responsibility boundaries. Four scenarios tested when a Canadian lead firm is responsible for labour violations in a Bangladeshi garment factory: wholly owned; independent but selling exclusively to that firm; selling 30% of output to it; selling 0.5% through an intermediary. Legal responsibility falls away quickly, moral responsibility more slowly, and what both track is the heterogeneity of power in a value chain. The voluntary model built on that power — supplier codes of conduct plus social audits — has largely failed, because audits do not capture wrongdoing and firms lack the incentive to cut suppliers out. The newer instruments (the US Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, the EU Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive) harness lead-firm power directly, internalizing the risk in the lead firm rather than the supplier.

The warning attached recurred all day. Due diligence asks firms for three capabilities they mostly do not have: mapping who is in the chain, identifying which nodes carry violations, and mitigating what they find. A firm that cannot build them may have another option. Faced with a supplier in Chad and a supplier in Belgium, it may concentrate production in Belgium, but only if it can afford the higher costs. Most companies cannot afford this, which to some extent explains the outsourcing of production to countries where wages are kept artificially low. Responsible business conduct and due diligence remain essential, but they cannot alone address systemic labour violations arising from governance gaps in producing countries. A smart mix of measures is therefore needed to strengthen labour market governance.

Panel 1 — North American unions and CUSMA

Stocktaking

  • Mexican, Canadian, and US unions in the auto sector have collaborated closely during the CUSMA renegotiations to ensure a unified approach to the treatment of North American union members.
  • Canadian unions have done solidarity work in Mexico since the early 1990s, in mining, manufacturing and auto. NAFTA’s labour provisions were weak, but they functioned as a platform. Because several Canadian unions are binational, that work has been tri-national more or less by default.
  • CUSMA represented a sharp step up in both the substance of the rights and the enforcement machinery. The Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM) permits a facility-level complaint about denial of freedom of association and collective bargaining, triggering investigation and potential border penalties. Canada also funded two large union solidarity projects for 2020–26.
  • Mexico’s 2019 labour reform and the re-legitimation of collective agreements changed the domestic baseline. Most incumbents were re-authorized, but independent unions gained recognition as bargaining agents — described from the Mexican side as a genuine leap forward, with more new agreements in services than in manufacturing.
  • A Cornell University empirical study found that the Mexican auto workers at facilities that had faced RRM enforcement action were relatively more aware of their labour rights and enforcement possibilities than workers that had not faced such action. The study suggested that the RRM helped disseminate knowledge, but raised concerning questions regarding which workers were empowered, and which were left behind, under CUSMA.
  • RRM filings have been heavily asymmetric: close to 50 petitions were accepted in the United States, while only two had been accepted in Canada.

Challenges

  • The wage gap has not closed. Mirror plants running the same global manufacturing system pay about $40 an hour in Indiana and about $3.50 in Mexico, with all-in US labour cost north of $70. The differential does not reach the consumer; it reaches shareholders. In real terms the Mexican auto wage is lower than it was in 1993.
  • The threat of relocation is used openly, at the bargaining table and during organizing drives. One complaint brought under Germany’s due diligence law required repeated litigation against the enforcement agency.
  • The labor advocates and union representative panelists stated that the RRM has drifted from its design. It was meant to work like a shop-floor grievance that a worker could file. However, it has become technical and lawyer-driven, which in Mexico reinforces the outsized role of attorneys inside unions. One perverse pattern reported: some unions had begun to file a case first to force Mexico to apply its own reformed law, then organize afterwards.
  • Reports from workers and unions alleged that workers who participated in the RRM faced discharge and blacklisting in retaliation.
  • Two footnotes – footnote 2 to Annex 31-A (US–Mexico) and footnote 5 to Annex 31-B (Canada–Mexico) under CUSMA – effectively limit US and Canadian workers from invoking the mechanism for violations at home. Canada and the United States can judge the treatment of Mexican workers; the reverse is not available.
  • Coverage is narrow: manufacturing only, not agriculture or services, and formal manufacturing employment in Mexico skews heavily male. Blacklisting, rare in Canada and the United States and common in Mexico, is not a covered denial of rights.
  • The Mexican labour market is contracting: some 183,000 maquiladora jobs lost 2024–26, about 63,000 in Ciudad Juárez alone, with plants closing and severance unpaid, and investment on hold pending the review.
  • From the Canadian side, the renegotiation has been derailed by the tariff conflict. Trade diversification — six to eight new agreements and several investment treaties — is unlikely to carry comparable labour provisions, and the government has introduced legislation restricting the right to strike in federally regulated sectors, justified by the need to present Canada as a reliable trading partner.

“The workers in Salau and the workers in Fort Wayne, Indiana, they do the exact same job. The workers in Fort Wayne make $40 an hour. Workers in Mexico make $3.50 an hour.”

“In the U.S., if we try to organize, they threaten to destroy our towns by pulling the work out. What happens in Mexico is they say, you’ll never work in this town again.”

“The fact that somehow our union workers aren’t facing the same types of harassment, the same types of discharges, as workers around the world is a legal fiction.”

Solutions

  • End the asymmetry. Remove the footnote and make the mechanism reciprocal and tri-national. This was the one reform endorsed across the panel and from the floor.
  • Extend coverage to agriculture and services, and add blacklisting and violence against workers as covered violations.
  • A continental sectoral minimum wage in durable-goods manufacturing, on a same-work, same-pay principle, with a view to catch-up rather than incremental gains off a small base.
  • Invest in worker education and civil society. A mechanism that most workers do not know exists and cannot file themselves is not an enforcement mechanism for them.
  • Continue to build solidarity and partnerships across sectoral unions across Mexico, the United States, and Canada.
  • Bring labour standards into anti-dumping and countervailing duty determinations, which under Canadian law are defined in almost exclusively commercial terms. Argued before the Canadian trade tribunal and summarily rejected.
  • A note of caution from the same panel: working lives improve when workers can organize and build economic power. Trade law’s contribution is to remove the barriers to that, and it is worth some humility about the limits of any mechanism, however well designed. While some solutions centered on expanding the RRM into new sectors and labour rights, lessons first needed to be learned about the Mechanism’s many weaknesses.

Video

A panelist (Prior Chair) ‘s account of the Rapid Response Mechanism. A chair of two of the three RRM panels that have concluded with a determination reported 53 cases to date: roughly 35 closed by agreement between the parties, three by panel determination, 15 pending. The outcomes include findings of unlawful company interference, changes of recognized union, new collective agreements, reinstatement, retroactive payments, neutrality letters, anonymous grievance mechanisms, fines and disciplinary action against company officials. Compared with the NAFTA, CAFTA and TPP models the cases resolve faster and the results are more substantive.

— a radical break from earlier labour chapters, driven primarily by deterrence, and open to activation by non-governmental entities. The caveats were his own: it is one instrument within a set, not a system, and what happens to it in the review depends on political variables nobody at the table controls.

Panel 2 — forced labour, due diligence models and carbon at the border

Stocktaking

  • Estimates of people in modern slavery reach 50 million. The trade is worth $150–400 billion a year, and on one calculation, were slavery a country, it would be the third largest carbon emitter. It has been illegal everywhere since the 1930s and is growing everywhere.
  • Two regulatory families now dominate. The common law transparency model (UK, Australia, Canada’s S-211) requires a statement and relies on the market to punish bad actors. The civil law due diligence model (France, Germany, Norway, the EU

directive) imposes a duty on directors to prevent and mitigate, with serious fines and civil liability, and applies only to the largest firms. Canada took a hybrid: UK transparency architecture plus strict personal accountability.

  • Human rights conditionality are increasingly incorporated into trade agreements, expanding from civil and political rights to labour and environment. It now appears in south-south agreements too, including the African Continental Free Trade Area, but focused on the priorities of younger, poorer societies: poverty eradication, women’s rights, youth rights, and capacity building rather than sanction.
  • A mapping of the trade instruments concluded since January 2025 found that the recent US reciprocal trade agreements focus predominantly on forced-labour import prohibitions, with varying obligations and references to Section 307. Informal US arrangements generally contain broader but aspirational commitments, while traditional FTAs retain more comprehensive, ILO-based labour provisions.
  • Informal US trade deals may be closer to traditional non-US FTAs in substantive scope, despite their limited legal force.
  • The EU’s carbon border adjustment mechanism extends an equivalent carbon cost to imports. The observation offered was that it also externalizes the EU’s own chosen method of mitigation, and frames a competitiveness problem in the language of global climate protection.

Challenges

  • Transparency without penalties becomes a tick-box exercise. Due diligence reaches only the largest firms — on one estimate, around 200 companies in France.
  • Forced labour language can serve as an alternative hook for tariffs after other legal bases have been struck down. The United States has not ratified ILO Convention 29 regarding forced labour.
  • Enforcement is uneven inside single agreements. Under EU–Mercosur, dispute settlement is binding for the trade rules but the sustainability chapter carries only a consultative mechanism. A deforestation breach yields consultation; a retaliatory trade ban yields a dispute. The results can conflict.
  • The objectives clause of most agreements tries to reconcile three things that do not fully cohere: the sovereign right to set your own level of protection; compliance with and improvement on minimum standards; and not lowering standards to attract trade and investment.
  • There is no uniform developing country effect from CBAM. Mozambique is both highly EU-dependent and highly carbon-intensive, with modelling putting 2% of national employment and 6% of the national wage bill at risk. South Africa’s iron and steel sector employs 260,000 people and cannot decarbonize faster than a coal-based grid allows. Ghana, Jordan, Uzbekistan and Morocco may gain. Exposure and the capacity to respond vary independently.
  • Carbon pricing adopted in order to satisfy CBAM also falls on firms that do not export to the EU, so the choice of instrument is a domestic distributive decision. Historical responsibility, redistribution of the revenue, and finance for adjustment are not addressed.
  • The digital economy makes circumvention easier, and data centres move to cheap energy and light regulation. International law tools still assume nation-states.
  • Differentiated labour obligations across trading partners raise questions about their underlying rationale, consistency with multilateral principles, and implications for businesses and workers.
  • The “in a manner affecting trade” condition has been read restrictively. One panel required proof of actual trade effects; a later ruling under a different treaty accepted potential effects, which was treated as the better view.

“It is illegal everywhere. But still it comes. It is no doubt a human rights tragedy, but it is also a business model. It is an economic crime, it’s low cost, it’s low risk, and it’s hyper-profitable.”

“We need to distinguish between true forced labour provisions and looking for an alternative hook to justify tariffs when other legal bases have been struck down.”

Solutions

  • Treat forced labour as an economic crime and use the whole legal system against it. Most jurisdictions already have the infrastructure: labour standards and health and safety inspectorates that can be asked to look for it; immigration law and the non-punishment principle; tax authorities, for a vast untaxed revenue stream; securities, consumer and investor protection; criminal fraud, where a false public statement is already an offence; director disqualification; money laundering; competition law. The claim made was that the same fifty words could be added to every Companies Act in the Commonwealth.
  • Harvest the intelligence transparency laws already generate. Published statements that nobody reads or uses to inform customs operations are wasted.
  • Agree common minimum standards internationally, because enforcement without a common standard has nothing to enforce, and make enforcement coherent across labour, human rights and environment rather than selective on one issue.
  • Recognize alternative routes to the same outcome. Zambia’s mitigation framework relies on environmental regulation, certification and accreditation; South Africa’s Climate Change Act uses other mechanisms again. Neither is acknowledged by an instrument that looks for one method rather than for the outcome.
  • Pair any raised standard with capacity building, action plans and transition periods, and use side letters with time-bound improvement commitments rather than lowering the bar below what every ILO member has already accepted.
  • Explore hybrid approaches combining binding enforcement, consultative dialogue, capacity building and meaningful stakeholder participation.
  • Pursue uniformity of wording. Where the obligation is the same, small differences in drafting create large differences in implementation.

Roundtable — is an authentic conversation possible?

Stocktaking

  • Five years ago, labour and environment had arguably achieved the core goal: they were no longer on a separate track from trade policy. The assessment offered was that the position has since regressed.
  • The pandemic reversed progress on child and forced labour, and the pressure to restart supply chains fell on the people already most exposed. The regulatory wave followed that recognition.
  • Labour is part of the sustainability frame, not an add-on to it. The link used to be hard to explain and now requires little imagination — but it is on the table in its most destructive form. Countries that once insisted trade and labour should never appear in the same sentence now accept that there is a linkage.

Challenges

  • When governments face economic crisis, attention moves away from sustainability. The risk is that the labour conversation is subsumed by the economic one.
  • The same instruments are simultaneously a real response and a facade for tariffs. That degrades the conversation for labour and for environment alike, and revives the protectionism objection that negotiators spent two decades answering.
  • Public opinion is asymmetric. There is a broad consensus that climate change must be addressed, and some willingness to bear a cost for it. There is no comparable consensus on forced and child labour, even though nobody defends them.
  • There is a breakdown of trust underneath all of it. People are losing pensions and houses, and are not being offered a serious conversation about adjustment; they are being offered a conversation about forced labour elsewhere, and asked to pay $5 more for the t-shirt without any confidence the $5 reaches a worker.
  • Liberalization has moved capital, goods and some factors of production. Labour governance stayed domestic. Until the appropriate governance level for each labour concern is worked out, the gap remains.
  • At firm level, the risk is cutting and running: a company decides it is not worth staying in a jurisdiction covered by a tariff or a due diligence duty, which does nothing about forced labour. Fragmentation across jurisdictions adds duplicative compliance burdens and invites circumvention.

Solutions

  • Reframe labour as an economic question. Resilient, strategic, reliable supply chains need protected workers, and a competitor using forced labour is running an illegal subsidy. Framed that way, the level playing field argument works for labour rather than against it.
  • A policy continuum rather than a contest between instruments: labour provisions in trade agreements to push partners towards robust domestic labour law; transparency and due diligence legislation to make firms identify and fix risk; forms of broader sustainability mechanisms and the import prohibition can be explored.
  • Take regionalism seriously as a site of experimentation and redistribution — regions understood as communities of committed states rather than as geography, with resources attached. Workers’ compensation systems, occupational safety and health institutions and social protection schemes can all be built out regionally, with private actors contributing as part of the trade arrangement rather than as compensation after it.
  • Build multilateral capacity deliberately, because governments and policies change and institutions are what carries continuity. The ILO is the only body with the tripartite structure to convene discussions on labour standards, while the OECD has played an important role in aligning due diligence approaches. Greater alignment of due diligence reporting requirements could reduce the burden while keeping firms as partners rather than adversaries.
  • The need to frame the relationship between trade protection and social protection more broadly was highlighted, by addressing the individualized risks associated with trade liberalization and the breakdown in public trust. While markets and other factors of production have become increasingly transnational, labour governance has largely remained domestic. Until we seriously consider the appropriate levels of labour governance, including transnational approaches to address and re-collectivize the risks of market activity, we will not get past the protectionism versus social protection dyad.
  • Widen the listening. Occupational safety and health is one of the fundamental principles and rights at work, is badly wanted by several states in the Global South, reaches many of the same value-chain problems, and is far less politicized. On the same logic, scope due diligence to the fundamental principles and rights at work — a middle ground between forced labour alone and the full EU human rights scope — since forced labour cannot be addressed in isolation from freedom of association.
  • The broader principle offered: no company should be permitted to gain privately at social cost. An end to externalities as an acceptable business model gives labour and environment a common conceptual starting point.

“We’ve expanded liberalization of some factors of production. And we have left labour domestic.”

“It has always surprised me that the general public has not been as aware and as tuned into issues of forced labour and child labour as one would expect them to be.”

“We should seize the crisis of the current moment. The house has been burned down when it comes to the trade system, and we now have a chance to ask, what gets rebuilt?”

Panel 3 — national measures and their enforcement

Stocktaking

  • Canada has two instruments. S-211 requires roughly 10,000 medium and large entities to report annually; between 4,000 and 5,000 do. In the latest annual report, 84% acknowledge a risk of forced or child labour in their supply chains. The import prohibition, in force since 2020, has produced about 50 shipments stopped for inspection and two seizures in five years.
  • Although S-211 does not impose due diligence obligations, its reporting requirements have encouraged some companies to introduce new policies, procedures and supplier codes of conduct.
  • Bill C-35 would add a rebuttable presumption and a published list of goods. The design intention stated was to remain country-agnostic, in contrast to the US regional approach, and to align with the generic US prohibition rather than the Uyghur Forced Labour Prevention Act. Consultations ran over the summer covering both the import prohibition and possible due diligence legislation.
  • The US reverse onus under US Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act’s rebuttable presumption has stopped more than 24,300 shipments in four years. Its own history is instructive: the 1930 prohibition sat largely dormant for half a century, the consumptive demand loophole was repealed only in 2016, and the Department of Labor’s list of goods has been produced since 2009.
  • The ILO’s recent mapping of trade-related measures shows that these measures can create leverage and remedial action. Their effect, however, depends heavily on context, and on their own they seldom lead to stronger labour protection or access to remedy when harm occurs. ILO experience points instead to a “smart mix” of public policy, private and voluntary measures, development cooperation and finance, underpinned by tripartite engagement. That combination is what turns leverage in trade and supply chains into stronger and more durable national labour protections.
  • Better Work is a joint ILO–IFC programme that brings together governments, employers’ and workers’ organizations, global brands, and other partners to improve working conditions in the garment industry. Operating at the intersection of public regulation and private supply-chain governance, it uses enterprise level evidence and trade, investment and supply chain incentives to support wider labour policy and institutional reform in producing countries. The programme traces its origins to the 1999 US–Cambodia quota agreement, which tied increases in export quotas to improved labour conditions, including child labour, in Cambodian garment factories. Since then, it has moved well beyond monitoring to link workplace improvements with sectoral action and stronger institutions.
  • In Bangladesh, Better Work helped connect its buyer network to a specialized ILO project piloting an employment injury insurance scheme at a sector level as a step towards a national system. Voluntary brand contributions provide transitional financing for worker benefits, while donor technical assistance helps develop a nationally anchored, no-fault scheme. The legal basis and institutional arrangement have been established while sustainable financing is being developed. With 92 participating brands contributing and benefits reaching 600 workers, and the pilot is now being extended beyond garments. It demonstrates how supply chain incentives and private sector engagement can lay the groundwork for a more durable national protection system.

Challenges

  • A transparency statute carries no due diligence obligation. A compliant report can disclose very little, and the reports that are filed use generic language, naming no suppliers and identifying no specific risks.
  • Border enforcement fails for a structural reason. A hammer looks like a hammer and a t-shirt looks like a t-shirt. Forced labour operates as a tariff classification question, which is the wrong architecture for it, and companies can simply ask the agency to prove it.
  • Traceability is close to impossible for most firms. Around 20% of the world’s cotton and a significant share of its polysilicon come from Xinjiang; material is traded in bulk, blended and reshipped, often within China; Chinese blocking rules can restrict such inquiries.
  • Tracing suppliers and their suppliers is particularly difficult for smaller buyers that lack the market power to obtain information or enforce standards further up the supply chain. Contractual flow-down through a supplier code of conduct breaks down fast, because a medium-sized buyer has no power over a supplier selling to a thousand others.
  • Conflict of laws has no clean answer. The Cuba precedent — US sanctions against a Canadian blocking statute that makes compliance with them unlawful — suggests firms will build legal fictions and workarounds rather than solutions.
  • The list is the hard part of C-35. It can only be built after the bill passes, must be kept current against shifting routings through certain countries, and will create diplomatic friction. It may also make companies say less in their S-211 reports.
  • Enforcement is under-resourced. A small team cannot read 5,000 reports, no penalties have been imposed in three years of implementation, and roughly half the covered entities are not reporting at all.
  • A ban can cost livelihoods in the exporting country without changing supplier behaviour, because importers move to another supplier rather than fix the first one.
  • The 84% figure may not mean what it appears to. The account from practice was that advisers push clients to acknowledge risk for credibility reasons, since no global supply chain is immune. The number records candor not located risk.
  • US technical assistance has been cut sharply at the moment when capacity building matters most.
  • Better Work is barely known in Canadian industry, according to an industry representative, despite many years of Canadian funding. One industry association reported a single conversation with government about it, and no outreach from missions abroad. The responsible business conduct strategy was described from participants as lacking not only a whole-of-government approach but a whole-of-department one.

“The Canada Border Services Agency sees a hammer cross the border, and a hammer looks like a hammer, and a t-shirt looks like a t-shirt. It does not look like a product made of forced labour.”

“No one is okay with forced labour in their supply chains. The question is, where’s the push coming from? If it’s coming from the consumer, then change will happen. It is not happening at the consumer level.”

“That’s what governments are for, market failures. I actually think that’s a market failure, it’s an externality that is not being captured.”

“What is it that this leverage ultimately leaves behind? What is it that it builds in the countries where the products are actually made that continues to protect workers and provide access to remedy even if trading conditions and policies change?

“Everything about forced labour should be about, is there less forced labour happening. The UFLPA can’t answer that, because it’s not what it does. It is not about forced labour. It’s about China.”

Solutions

  • Move from classification to a sanction architecture: a reverse onus with a properly built, targeted list of entities and regions, and removal from the list on cure. That puts usable tools in companies’ hands. The counter-caution was that the broad regional presumption broke US ports and customs systems, and Canada should not go that far.
  • Build the ladder of impact deliberately: what changes at the workplace, how gains are extended at sectoral level through bargaining and shared financing, and what law and institutions change nationally. Then apply the test — do the gains survive the end of the trade preference, the sourcing relationship, or the project? For policy design, this means deciding from the outset how public and private measures and partnerships will be aligned so that they reinforce one another and build the institutions and policies that secure protection and access to remedy over the long term.
  • Learn from trade and investment incentives which show promise. In Uzbekistan, systematic child and forced labour in the cotton harvest ended through a combination of trade incentives, conditions attached to IFI lending, sustained pressure from the Cotton Campaign, and ILO monitoring. One major brand conditions sourcing on the presence of a Better Work programme, and the ILO in turn conditioned new programmes on governments addressing supervisory body comments — which produced trade union law reform in Egypt. Incentives of this kind are no silver bullet, and both law and practice still need further reform in each country. Even so, these cases show what trade and investment incentives can achieve when they are deliberately put to use.
  • Write remedy into law, covering wages owed and the care needed to recover. Honour other jurisdictions’ findings, so goods refused at one border cannot be sold at the next. Protect the freedom to organize as the surest guarantee against recurrence.
  • Treat civil society as the eyes and ears on the ground and invest in the science — isotopic origin testing and cotton DNA testing are now reaching customs laboratories, and traceability software gets cheaper the more it is used.
  • Avoid perverse incentives. If a firm is to do the work of finding out what is in its supply chain, it cannot be penalized simply for reporting what it finds; the decision tree needs an off-ramp.
  • Address purchasing practices. Some suppliers cannot comply because of the terms their buyers impose on them, not because they intend not to.
  • Promote what already works and connect industry associations and diplomatic missions abroad to it. For example, promote initiatives such as Better Work more actively through these channels.
  • Trade measures addressing forced labour should be assessed by whether they improve conditions and provide remedies for workers, rather than solely by their enforcement outcomes at the border.

Closing remarks

The closing remarks came from the sponsor of S-211 and set out how the law was made and what it has and has not achieved. More than 27 million people are in forced labour worldwide on the narrower definition, and 55 million children are in hazardous work. Canadians buy more than $63 billion a year in products that may be linked to forced labour. Two points cut against the assumption that this is a developing country problem: the Boohoo scandal in the United Kingdom, where workers, many of them immigrants, were reportedly paid a quarter to a third of the minimum wage; and Canada’s closed work permits, which tie temporary foreign workers to a single employer and which the former UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of slavery warned in 2023 create fertile ground for contemporary slavery.

The legislative history was offered as a lesson in what is achievable. S-211 was a private member’s bill, restarted three times in the Senate, drafted on the model of the Extractive Sector Transparency Measures Act, and deliberately moderate: moderate requirements were what made cross-party support possible in a minority Parliament without uniting the business community against it. The trade-off was explicit. Human rights NGOs wanted a due diligence regime and some called for the bill to be killed. But European due diligence laws reach only large firms — around 200 companies in France — whereas a transparency duty reaches 10,000 Canadian entities, including the medium-sized firms where much of the exposure sits.

The assessment of results was candid. The law requires honest reporting on effort; it does not require any company to eliminate forced labour from its supply chain. Reports are generic, a very small team administers it, no penalties have been imposed, and about half of the entities that should report do not. What has changed is that companies are now having internal conversations that were not happening before. The asks were specific: impose the penalties the Act already provides, make the guidelines more specific, read the reports, and use what they contain. Bill C-35’s reverse onus was welcomed as a major step, with the warning that the list is where it will succeed or fail, and that no country, least of all China, will accept being named on it quietly.

“As the old saying goes, laws are like sausages. It’s better not to know how they’re made.”

“The law requires companies to report honestly on their effort. It does not require them to eliminate forced labour from their supply chains.”

Questions for future research

One unresolved tension ran through the day, and the chair of the first panel named it directly. Three things were said in sequence and are difficult to hold together: workers across the three countries are cooperating closely and effectively; the Rapid Response Mechanism is somewhat flawed; and the consensus proposal is to expand it into more sectors, more rights and more agreements.

  1. What is the mechanism’s theory of change, and does it support expansion? Judged on Mexican wages, the RRM has fallen short of expectations. Judged on from the perspective of protecting workers’ freedom of association rights at specific facilities, it the Mechanism appears to be working has worked. Judged from the perspective of generating participation among workers in the North American supply chain, the Mechanism appears to be lagging behind expectations. Expansion arguments should be deliberate in how they capitalize on the former while minimizing the latter need to say which outcome they are buying. Does the expansion of the Mechanism to agriculture and services require a different instrument? The RRM is facility-level and built around a traded good with an identifiable plant. Informal and agricultural work may not have such identifiable facilities.
  2. Would a reciprocal, tri-national mechanism survive contact with Canadian and US labour law? Participants endorsed removing the RRM footnotes mentioned above that render the Mechanism asymmetrical. However, participants struggled to reconcile a symmetrical operation with caseload demands, the jurisdictional problem that the Canadian labour law is largely provincial. Does the extension to agriculture and services require a different instrument? The RRM is facility-level and built around a traded good with an identifiable plant. Informal and agricultural work may not have such identifiable facilities.
  3. How much fragmentation is productive? Divergent national models allow experimentation and let subsequent legislators borrow the best parts. They also impose duplicative burdens, invite circumvention and risk encouraging a race to the bottom. Mutual recognitions seem more accessible than harmonization while respecting equivalence. But to operate such flexible standards in the context of labour and trade.
  4. How can we further integrate trade and labour and ensure the benefits of trade are more equally distributed? Different combinations of instruments, including border measure and domestic regulations, can be used to best serve both labour and trade interests.
  5. What lessons can be learned from the integration of environment considerations into trade? Border tax adjustment mechanisms, import prohibitions, international standards, including mutual recognition, transparency, including in the WTO trade policy mechanisms, Subsidy WTO framework (green, yellow and red) can be explored to integrate labour into trade. Responsibility for implementing them can also be explored and should be shared between different stakeholders.
  6. There are differences between environment and labour considerations in international trade. In the climate context, the common objective is reducing GHG emissions and substantially comparable standards for doing so are acceptable (and the Paris Agreement allows countries to determine their own contributions and choose the domestic measures through which they pursue them). In the labour context, the ILO’s fundamental principles and rights at work provide a common normative foundation, with the obligation to respect, promote and realize them arising from ILO membership, regardless of ratification, while ratified Conventions create specific treaty obligations. Fundamental rights cannot be replaced by supposedly equivalent alternatives; for example, higher wages cannot compensate for the denial of freedom of association. The flexibility lies primarily in how these standards are implemented and enforced, rather than in the standards themselves. The lesson from the environmental debate is therefore not that different substantive labour standards should be mutually recognised, but that importing countries should accommodate different domestic regulatory and institutional approaches where these genuinely respect applicable rights and obligations in law and practice, with credible enforcement, worker participation and access to remedy. This would, of course, require effective implementation and verification.
  7. Who bears the cost of a higher standard? Exit from riskier jurisdictions, asymmetric CBAM exposure, RRM enforcement and job displacement after a ban all point to the same gap. None of the instruments discussed adequately accounts for adjustment or compensation for workers in the exporting country.
  8. What role do consumers play? While consumers may support stronger labour protections, they may not be fully aware of the implications for their purchasing power. Consumer engagement, including through social media, can influence corporate behaviour, although it cannot substitute for regulation or responsible business conduct. The extent to which higher labour standards affect consumer prices, and whether consumers are willing to bear these costs, warrants further economic research. Such research could also examine how the costs and benefits of improved social and environmental standards are distributed among suppliers, brands, retailers, workers and consumers, and how purchasing practices, pricing and profit margins shape these outcomes. The influence of socially responsible investors on buyer behaviour and practices also warrants examination. Lawyers should draw on economists’ expertise on these questions, as consumer acceptance of such measures will influence governments’ decisions on their adoption.

INSERT COLLOQUIUM GROUP PHOTO HERE USING A WORDPRESS IMAGE BLOCK

Colloquium participants, University of Ottawa, 23 October 2026.

Summary prepared from the meeting recordings. Held under Chatham House rules: contributions are reported without attribution.

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